INTRODUCTION

The 2003 blackouts in North America and Europe showed the importance of load-shedding during wide area disturbances. The analysis of the events that ended with system collapse resulted in multiple recommendations from the international commissions. Some of them highlight the importance and need for improvements of underfrequency load-shedding and at the same time require the implementation of undervoltage load-shedding. The paper briefly analyses the blackouts in North America and Italy and describes different methods for load-shedding based on centralized and distributed solutions. Combination of frequency, rate-of-change of frequency or the average rate-of-change of frequency elements allows the development of very advanced load-shedding schemes. Undervoltage load shedding can also be implemented in a substation level device or in the individual distribution feeder relays based on the voltage or rate-of-change of voltage. IEC 61850 defined substation automation systems with highspeed peer-to-peer communications that can be used for centralised load-shedding not only based on underfrequency or undervoltage conditions, but also when a load-shedding
command has been received from a special protection scheme at the system level.
THE NORTH AMERICAN BLACKOUT
The largest North American blackout occurred on 14 August, 2003, about 4:10 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). It resulted in the loss of more than 70,000 megawatts (MW) of electrical load in parts of Ohio, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, and the Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec [1] . The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) immediately initiated significant efforts focused on collecting system data from different sources -protection and control IEDs, disturbance recorders, sequence of event recorders, data acquisition and energy management systems in an attempt to establish a precise sequence of events leading up to the blackout. It is impossible to describe the hundreds of events that occurred before and during the final stage of this wide area disturbance, so we will concentrate on some issues related to load-shedding. For example, the frequency in the Cleveland area dropped rapidly, and between 16:10:39 and 16:10:50, underfrequency load shedding in that area interrupted about 1,750 MW of load. However, this was not enough to reach a balance with local generation and stop the frequency decline. This last phase of the cascade is basically about the search for balance between loads and generation in the various islands that have formed. The primary mechanism for reaching that balance was underfrequency load shedding (UFLS). The following UFLS [1] Fig. 1 gives an overview of the power flows and frequencies during the period 16:10:45 through 16:11:00, capturing the effect of most of the key events in the final phase of the cascade. The USA-Canadian commission completed the analysis of the blackout and published a detailed final report [1] . Section V of the report includes 17 recommendations intended to try to fix the deficiencies discovered through the analysis of the blackout. There is no space in the paper to list all of them, so we are going to concentrate on the ones related to loadshedding. The text below is from the Final Report, with additional information available in the complete text of the document. The regions are requested to promote the installation of under-voltage load shedding capabilities within critical areas, as determined by the studies to be effective in preventing an uncontrolled cascade of the power system. The NERC investigation of the August 14 blackout has identified additional transmission and generation control and protection issues requiring further analysis. One concern is that generating unit control and protection schemes need to consider the full range of possible extreme system conditions, such as the low voltages and low and high frequencies experienced on August 14, 2003. The team also noted that improvements may be needed in underfrequency load shedding and its coordination with generator under and overfrequency protection and controls.
C C I I R R E E D D
ITALIAN BLACKOUT
About 6 weeks later, on Sunday, 28 September, 2003 at 3.25 a.m. Italy also experienced its largest black out ever [2] . Within 10 seconds almost 7000 MW, coming from the neighbouring countries, was cut as the 15 high voltage 245 kV and 420 kV tie-lines experienced a cascading effect. At that moment the load in Italy was at its weekly minimum, almost 27.5 GW (peak load: 52 GW). Almost 50 conventional thermal units were in service approximately at their minimum load, mostly under-excited, a condition of low stability. Small units (less then 50 MW) embedded in the distribution network, generated approximately 3000 MW. The most important hydro power plants, especially those with black start capabilities, were pumping for a total of almost 3500 MW (included in the 27.5 GW). Considering that almost 3000 MW was flowing from Switzerland to Italy, the events were: 3.01: a fault of a 420 kV transmission line inside Switzerland due to a tree. 3.15: Operators of the Swiss power Coordinator called the GRTN operating room of the National Control Center (NCC) in Rome asking to reduce the import of 300 MW, but without informing of the previous event.
3.25: a second fault of a 420 kV transmission line inside Switzerland due to over-current. After this second event the power flow re-distributed into the 245 kV links to Italy, which tripped due to overcurrent. It was the start of the separation between the Italian power system and the other countries (France, Switzerland, Austria and Slovenia), which happened in the following few seconds. The frequency declined immediately, beginning a transient period lasting for 149 seconds. During it the automatic load shedding tripped the pumping load and the frequency stopped at 49 Hz (in respect to 50 Hz) after 2 seconds from the separation. Unfortunately, 3300 MW of deficit still remained.
The frequency continued to slowly drop as the automatic load shedding started to shed industrial and customer loads at every 0.1 Hz step of frequency decrease. Unfortunately, during this process 21 thermal production units tripped, one by one, for a total of approximately 3650 MW together with the small units connected to the distribution network (more susceptible to frequency variations). The frequency decreased to 47.5 Hz that resulted in the tripping of all units due to under-frequency operation, leading to the final blackout at 3.28.03 AM [2] . Sardinia Island was the only part of the country that was not affected, because it was electrically separated from continental Italy, due to maintenance of the direct current link. After the Italian black out, GRTN (the Italian ISO) started several activities to improve system security under all operation conditions. One of the activities currently underway is the possibility to better manage the concept of power system section, considered as the vulnerable borderline between two areas of the electric network, one of which generally lacks power, with the other oversupplied (Fig. 2 ). There are sections in which a possible failure of a transmission line running through them can cause a state of unsecure operation, such as the overload of other lines going through that section. If this state is not promptly adjusted, it may lead to outages of these lines, separation of the areas, and consequently the loss of synchronism of generators, voltage collapse and, eventually, a blackout in the undersupplied area. The sections that may cause such a sequence are known as critical. The Italian power system features some potentially critical sections, the most important and dangerous of which is the International Section, with its massive energy transfers towards Italy, currently totalling about 6500 MW and the Italian power system on the deficit side of the section. To tackle the above-mentioned events, some adjustments are to be applied, such as load-shedding in some areas and generation shedding in other sections in inner Italy. This will allow the control of both shortages and excesses, with less than one second elapsing between the detection of the critical condition and the execution of the shedding. network to under-frequency transients; • improvement of Emergency Load Shedder (BME) using automatic procedures; Currently load-shedding in Italy is based exclusively on frequency relays, during under-frequency conditions after the separation of the national transmission system from the interconnected European system. Figure 4 shows the drop of the voltage and the partial recovery after the shedding, which is sufficient to avoid network separation even though voltage levels are still depressed. Figure 5 shows how the impedance measured by the line distance protection turns back from the protection zone after the 1500 MW load-shedding shown in Fig. 4 . It is clear that, at least for the Italian power system, undervoltage load shedding can be used as an additional defence system to avoid the cascading separation of a critical system section. 
LOAD SHEDDING SYSTEMS IN SUBSTATIONS
Several issues complicate the effectiveness of different loadshedding methods. One issue is that the loads in the system are not constant and vary with the time of day, day of the week and the season. When the load-shedding system trips pre-defined distribution feeders, load variation makes it difficult to predict how much load will be shed at a specific time and at a specific point on the power system. This problem can be resolved using advance multifunctional Continuos monitoring of the loading of the distribution feeders included in the load-shedding system can be used to adapt the configuration of the system to optimise the loadshedding. In such systems it is possible to perform two types of load-shedding -centralised or local. Centralised load shedding is achieved at the substation level where voltage or frequency is sensed on one or more busses and a centralised decision is made to select which feeders will be included in the load-shedding. As soon as a decision is made, control signals are sent to trip the distribution feeders breakers. In conventional substations this is achieved using hard wiring between the substation level IED and the breakers. In IEC 61850 based substation automation systems the substation IED sends a GOOSE or GSSE message to the breaker IEDs that then trip their associated breakers. Local load-shedding is performed at the same location where the voltage or frequency sensing is performed. This minimises the need for communication equipment and also may increase reliability, due to the fact that a single IED failure is not going to lead to a complete load-shedding failure. Local loadshedding is easy to achieve, since state-of-the-art distribution feeder protection relays have built-in frequency and voltage elements that can be used to perform this function during wide area system disturbances.
UNDERVOLTAGE LOAD-SHEDDING
Considering the fact that the detection of undervoltage conditions will result in different levels of load-shedding that may lead to significant economic losses, it is very important to avoid misoperation due to failures in the voltage circuits of the IED. The undervoltage protection included within a distribution feeder or a substation level protection IED may consist of several independent stages. These are typically configurable for either phase-to-phase or phase-to-neutral measuring. One stage may be selected with inverse time characteristic that will allow the protection element to operate with a different time delay depending on the severity of the system wide disturbance. In order to avoid operation, the protection IED may be configured through the programmable scheme logic to block the undervoltage element tripping for the maximum possible short circuit fault clearing time. If undervoltage load shedding might require operating time faster than the maximum short circuit fault clearing time, it may be supervised by phase or sequence overcurrent fault detectors that will operate for fault conditions, but will not pickup for the system disturbance conditions. As said previously, another solution can be the use of rate-ofchange of voltage signals.
Tackling the problem globally, voltage circuit supervision logic is used to detect any failure in the voltage circuit. For example, a fuse failure in the voltage circuit will be seen by the IED as a voltage collapse in one or more phases and will result in an undesired load-shedding. That is why a voltage circuit supervision element can be used to alarm and block the operation of the undervoltage load-shedding scheme. 
FREQUENCY LOAD-SHEDDING
Advance underfrequency load-shedding can be achieved in local or centralised schemes using multiple independent stages. Each stage may be configured to operate based on a different criteria, as required by the specifics of the wide area disturbance being considered:
• Time-delayed underfrequency (f+t).
• Frequency supervised rate of change of frequency (f+df/dt).
• Time delayed rate of change of frequency (df/dt +t).
• Frequency supervised average rate of change of frequency (f+Df/Dt). The combination of these different underfrequency loadshedding elements in multiple load-shedding stages allows the development of very advanced systems that will meet the requirements of various abnormal system conditions.
CONCLUSIONS
The 2003 blackouts in North America and Europe demonstrated the important role that frequency and voltage based load-shedding may play in preventing such events in the future. Modern multifunctional protection IEDs with built-in advanced voltage and frequency protection elements and programmable scheme logic can be configured to provide proper protection and reduce the probability for a system blackout.
